In the previous chapter I outlined Kenneth Craik’s suggestion that we should understand mental representation in terms of models in the brain, where, for Craik, a model is a kind of representation that capitalizes on relational similarity to its target. In this short post, I’m going to briefly elaborate on how I think the concept … Continue reading Chapter 4. Models as Idealised Structural Surrogates
In this post I’m going to outline the contents of my third chapter. This chapter is partially based on a paper I have in Philosophical Explorations. I now think that this paper is mistaken in some important respects, however. This thesis chapter does a much better job on this topic. Chapter Aim The main aim … Continue reading Chapter 3: Kenneth Craik’s “Hypothesis on the Nature of Thought”
In this blog post I’m going to briefly(ish!) outline the contents of the second chapter of my doctoral thesis. This chapter is probably the most boring of the thesis, but it lays the groundwork for some of the views that I defend in later chapters, as well as the methodological approach that I follow throughout … Continue reading Chapter 2: ‘The Representation Wars’
In this series of blog posts, I’m going to write up brief overviews of the contents of my doctoral thesis, “The Mind as a Predictive Modelling Engine: Generative Models, Structural Similarity, and Mental Representation.” In this post I’ll summarise Chapter 1, which outlines the philosophical context of the thesis, the chief claims I defend, and … Continue reading The Mind as a Predictive Modelling Engine. Chapter 1: Overview
In recent years the term “virtual signalling” has entered the public lexicon. Although the expression’s original use within signalling theory was purely descriptive, it is now almost always used pejoratively. Virtue signalling is this sense is something that other people do—a conspicuous display of moral virtue designed to enhance the person’s status within a particular … Continue reading Am I The Sarah Huckabee Sanders Of My Brain?
In a recent article and then blog post I put forward a challenge to highly influential (e.g. here and here) hierarchical Bayesian models of psychosis in computational psychiatry. Phil Corlett—one of the most prominent champions of such models—has offered a compelling response to this challenge. What follows is partly an elaboration and defence of the claims … Continue reading Bayes Mania, Just-So Stories, and the Irrational Mind